N TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY St. Augustine is renowned for his doctrine of the filioque: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as from a single principle. This doctrine gave to Western trinitarian thought and indeed to Western theology in general a distinctive stamp, which despite the upheavals of its history has remained with it ever since. Alongside the filioque, however, Augustine offered an alternative way of conceiving the Trinity, in which the Holy Spirit appears as the mutual love of Father and Son, the so-called mutual-love theory. Though it is less well known and indeed held suspect by some Western theologians, this second way has always managed to keep alive in the West, and has even found sympathetic echoes in Eastern Orthodoxy, despite the fact that in general the East has not been well disposed to Augustine's idea that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of divine love. Indeed, the hope has been expressed that this theory will prove to be the key to full agreement between East and West on the procession of the Spirit. 
data with the knowledge of the immanent Trinity that has been extrapolated from them. But the biblical data, while they do not go so far as to embrace either the economic or the immanent Trinity, are more than a mere material sign: they constitute a certain doctrine of the Trinity which cannot be classified as either economic or immanent. For want of a better word, I shall call it the "biblical" doctrine of the Trinity. This is a doctrine in which the Father is Yahweh, called Father by Jesus because of the unique nature of his relationship to Him, a relationship which combines authority with intimacy; a doctrine in which the Son is Jesus, though his Sonship is not yet understood as an ontological reality requiring an incarnation in the metaphysical sense; and a doctrine in which the Holy Spirit appears now impersonally as the spirit, or power, of God, and now as this same power impregnated with the human personality of Jesus, though not yet grasped as a person in his own right. It is from these data that the doctrine of the immanent Trinity is inferred by the Church over a period of four centuries, and along with it, by an automatic process of integration, the doctrine of the economic Trinity as the conclusion of this illative process.
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It may be thought that Augustine's methodology is left in tatters by this criticism, but not so. It may have been primitive but it was not essentially unsound. At least in regard to the filioque, he showed that he realized that theological statements about God must be grounded in what is said directly in Scripture and also that their form is indicated from that source.
It is different, however, when we come to the mutual-love theory. Here we find no serious attempt to argue from Scripture. The one exception I can find is in an early work, De fide et symbolo, where Augustine is claiming to be reporting the opinion of other theologians. This Godhead, then, which they wish to be understood likewise as their [i.e., of the Father and the Son] mutual love and charity, they say is called the Holy Spirit. And this opinion they support by many proofs from the Scriptures, for 5 example, "For the love of God is shed in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us," and many other such testimonies. 6 It is hard to see how this text (Rom 5:5) constitutes a proof of Augustine's theory. In the first place, it is concerned with God's relations to us rather than with the immanent Trinity; and secondly, it speaks of the love of God rather than the mutual love of the Father and the Son. It would be churlish to press the first objection against Augustine, considering how early was his place in trinitarian speculation. And perhaps the same should be said of the second objection too, but with the difference that, whereas the first is superable, the second is not. As one reads on from the passage quoted, it is clear that for Augustine the love of God was the mutual love of the Father and the Son. It did not occur to him to conceive of it in any other way. But later theology was to distinguish clearly between these two loves. Even if one could show from Scripture that the Holy Spirit is the divine love, that He is also the mutual love of the Father and the Son would still remain to be shown.
Apart from this example, Augustine is content to argue from the filioque rather than from Scripture. The argument begins, then, with the assertion that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son as well as of the Father. In one form it ends with the statement that the Spirit is the "communion" that exists between them. Between beginning and end there can occur another and quite ingenious way of conceiving the Holy Spirit:
... The Holy Spirit ... is properly called Holy Spirit relatively, since He is referred to both the Father and the Son, because He is the Spirit of both the Father and the Son. But the relation is not itself apparent in that name, but it is apparent when He is called the gift of God, for He is the gift of the Father and of the Son, because "He proceeds from the Father," as the Lord says, and because that which the Apostle says, "He who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him," he certainly says of the Holy Spirit. When, therefore, we say the gift of the giver, and the giver of the gift, we speak in both cases relatively in reciprocal reference. Therefore the Holy Spirit is a certain unutterable communion of the Father and the Son. To move from the filioque to the idea of the Holy Spirit as the communion of the Father and the Son, Augustine here invokes the idea of the Holy Spirit as "gift," the common gift of Father and Son. In principle there is nothing wrong with conceiving the Holy Spirit in this way, though Scripture never says it, and neither does it say directly that Christ gives the Spirit. When Scripture speaks of the Holy Spirit as gift, He is the gift of the Father, not of Christ.
8 Of the latter it is simply said that he "sends" the Spirit as his own. Presumably, this is because properly speaking the Spirit is only "given" by Him from whom He issues ultimately, i.e. the Father. But if Christ can make the Spirit his own, he too can "give" Him. In showing this from Scripture, Augustine regularly cites Jn 4:7-15, Acts 8:20, Rom 5:5, and Eph 4:7-8. Of these, only the first and the last are relevant, as the others fail even to mention Christ. The Ephesians text has Christ "giving" us "grace," not, therefore, the Holy Spirit, though this may be implied. And the Johannine text has Jesus telling the Samaritan woman of the "living water," later identified in 7:39 as the Holy Spirit, that he "would have given" if asked. However, two qualifications are to be noted: first, the language of giving occurs in the context of giving someone a drink; and secondly, even in this passage (v. 10) the Holy Spirit (probably) is referred to as "the gift of God" (the Father). We can accept Augustine's doctrine of the Spirit as the common gift, but in so doing we should take care not to lose the full import of the clear scriptural doctrine of the Spirit as the gift of God the Father.
In the text quoted, but more clearly in De trinitate 5, 15 (16) and 16 (17), Augustine shows awareness that he is speaking of the economic Trinity when he says that the Holy Spirit is the common gift of the Father and the Son, i.e. he is saying that He is their gift to us. This raises the question as to whether the Spirit may be called Gift also in the immanent Trinity. Augustine does not address the question thus clearly put, but he does, in the section just referred to, consider whether the Spirit is a gift "eternally" (sempiterne), to which he answers in the affirmative. However, this is not the same question, and his answer is not particularly helpful. He argues that, as God is eternally Lord but becomes our Lord only in time, so the Spirit is eternally Gift but becomes gift to us only in time. While this is true, it still only tells us about the Spirit's relation to us and not about His relation to the other two persons in the immanent Trinity, though obviously there has to be an inferential relationship between the two. However, despite the attractive contrast between Giver and Gift, paralleling that between Father and Son, the Holy Spirit cannot be the common gift of the Father and the Son in the immanent Trinity. This is because it is of the essence of a gift that it be bestowed gratuitously, whereas all that happens in the immanent Trinity does so with a necessity of nature. Later I shall take up again the question of what is implied for the immanent Trinity by the statement that the Holy Spirit is the common gift of the Father and the Son to us.
In the light of these observations it is possible to say that in the biblical Some, however, have gone so far as to believe that the very communion of the Father and the Son, and, so to speak, their Godhead, which the Greeks call theotêta, is the Holy Spirit, so that, since the Father is God and the Son God, the Godhead itself, in which they are united to each other, the former by begetting the Son and the latter by cleaving to the Father, should thereby be constituted equal to Him by whom He is begotten.
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The passage then continues as quoted. We observe that the transition from communion to mutual love in the second part of it is made without argument, though, as I noted, an attempt is then made to justify the mutual-love theory from Scripture.
Clearly, Augustine sees no great difference between communion and mutual love. One passes naturally from the former to the latter, and no argument is needed: "Therefore the Holy Spirit, whatever it is, is something common to the Father and the Son. But this communion itself is consubstantial and coeternal; and if it may fitly be called friendship, let it be so called; but it is more aptly called love."
10 Nor is any appeal made to Scripture to justify this conclusion.
In 
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In a passage close to the last one in the De trinitate we see an inference directly from the filioque to the mutual-love theory, without reference to communion. This is explained by the fact that the two ideas have become practically identical for him: "The Holy Spirit, according to the Holy Scriptures, is neither of the Father alone nor of the Son alone, but of both, and so reveals to us the common love with which the Father and the Son love each other,"
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In its earliest formulation Augustine felt some obligation to provide scriptural foundation for the mutual-love theory, though he was unable to do this in a satisfactory way. But by the end of the De trinitate it had become for him an almost self-evident variation or extension of the filioque, and so did not require any justification beyond mere mention. Certainly, no attempt is there made to substantiate it from Scripture. In fact, though, as I shall show, the filioque and the mutual-love theory are very different from each other.
In the course of this brief examination we have seen a number of shortcomings in Augustine's theological methodology, some of which are quite serious by present-day standards. However, as it would be both pedantic and unjust to judge him in general by these standards, I shall here concern myself only with the question of whether in his presentation of the mutual-love theory all that is necessary is correction and updating, or whether in his thought the theory lacks all proper foundation and so should be judged to be not proven. It is my contention that the latter alternative is the case.
We do find in Augustine the necessary scriptural foundation for the filioque. In brief, if the NT tells us that Jesus sends us as his own the Holy Spirit from the Father, as Augustine is able to assure us it does, then ultimately in the immanent Trinity the Holy Spirt must proceed from the Father and the Son as from a single principle. From what has been said about the three forms of the doctrine of the Trinity it will be clear that the mutual-love theory, which has to do with the immanent and the economic Trinity, cannot simply be demonstrated from Scripture. But if it is true, it must be founded on Scripture in some way. In this part of the essay I shall uncover the biblical foundations of the theory. The exercise contains two parts. The first concerns the proposition that the Holy Spirit is the Father's love for Jesus; the second, that the same Spirit is Jesus' answering love for the Father. Because of this structure of gift and response, with the second part we shall have attained the biblical foundation of the theory.
The Holy Spirit as the Father's Love for Jesus
That Jesus is the beloved, only-begotten Son of God is the clear teaching of the NT. His divine Sonship, or divinity as we say today, is not conceived there as the Church would later conceive it in its official teaching, i.e. ontologically, and hence as a metaphysical incarnation, but functionally, in terms of the role he was predestined to play in salvation history. Even where the NT speaks of the pre-existence of Jesus, as it does in the Gospel of John (and only there), it thinks of his divine Sonship in a functional way. It thinks, therefore, of the Incarnation also in functional terms, as a change of state, the exchange of immortality for mortality (for flesh, doomed to die) by a glorious pre-existent man, rather than as the assumption of humanity by a hitherto purely divine being.
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The dogma of a metaphysical incarnation, as taught by Chalcedon, represents development of doctrine and also hermeneusis, the reinterpretation of truth from one cultural framework into another, based on this Johannine vision.
If the concept of a metaphysical incarnation was not available to the NT writers for making understandable the divine Sonship of Jesus, how did they conceive the action or process of his divinization? I have already indicated that this was not a question that occurred in the purview of the Johannine theology. But it does occur in the Synoptics, and they answered it by reference to the Holy Spirit. According to them, Jesus' divine Sonship was brought about by the bestowal of the Holy Spirit on him by God (the Father). And the Holy Spirit, as the power of God, gave to Jesus the power to adhere to and fulfil his predestined role of Savior. This latter power is conceived both negatively, in terms of never acting against God's will, and hence as perfect sinlessness, about which the NT is emphatic in the case of Jesus, and positively, in terms of always seeking and acting in accordance with God's will, therefore perfect obedience, about which the NT is no less insistent. It is by his obedience that a man is shown to be a true son to his father. In Synoptic theology the divine Sonship of Jesus is actualized in his perfect obedience to God's special will for him, along which path he is guided by the empowering Spirit to his unique destiny. All three elements belong together as constituting the full reality of Jesus' divine Sonship: it is (a) created by the bestowal of the Spirit, and it is (6) realized not only by a general obedience on his part, but by a particular obedience which leads to (c) the fulfilment of his unique vocation, his mediatorial and representative role as Savior of humankind. His fidelity to this vocation led inexorably to the cross but also beyond it to the resurrection. In Synoptic theology, therefore, the divine Sonship of Jesus is produced by the bestowal on him of the Holy Spirit by the Father, and, in the power of this Spirit, is actualized in the obedience of his life and death and is completed and revealed in his resurrection. This theology has emerged in recent times as a real alter native to the hitherto dominant Johannine theology of incarnation. In contrast to the latter, the method is that of ascending theology, despite the fact that the Christology of the Synoptics is high rather than low. This is true particularly of Jesus' relationship with God. As his obedience, tested and established in suffering, purified him and eventually, in death, made him perfect (Phil 2:8; Heb 5:8-9, 2:10), so he became, in life ever more completely and in death perfectly, the Son of God. But this Sonship, which depended not just on his obedience but on his love, a love which was a response to that of the Father, was not just his own work. It was that, but before that it was made possible, was initiated and carried through by the Spirit bestowed on him by God. Indeed, its initiation took place without co-operation on his part. In other words, the love with which Jesus drew ever closer to the Father through the events of his life and which reached its perfection in his death was words, "and (he) gave up the spirit," that are of special interest to us. I note first the unusual verb, paredöken ("handed over"), to be contrasted with Matthew's aphienai ("yielded up") in "and he yielded up the spirit" (Mt 27:50). This has given rise to the question whether John is here referring, in a deliberate higher meaning, to the conferment of the Holy Spirit by Jesus on his mother and the beloved disciple as representatives of the nascent Church. I defer discussion of this point to the third stage of this section, where it rightfully belongs. And we begin by taking up the observation of Raymond Brown that the verb is the same as that used by the Septuagint to describe the sacrificial death of the Suffering Servant in Isa 53:12. 26 Indeed, the whole clause is similar, for the Septuagint states that "his soul was handed over to death." Significantly, though, John, like the Hebrew text of Isaiah, has the verb in the active voice, thus emphasizing the freedom of Jesus, whereas the Septuagint has the passive, thus stressing the inevitability of the Servant's fate. We note also that the Septuagint says "soul" (psyche), whereas John, like Matthew and Luke, has "spirit" (pneuma). If in John the change from "soul" to "spirit" is deliberate, it is explained by the difference in emphasis of the two words. While there is considerable overlap between them, "soul" refers more to the natural life, whereas "spirit" indicates life lived before God. We are here brought face to face with the uniqueness of Jesus. Plenty of others, the prophets for example, had been given the Holy Spirit by God. But Jesus was given the Spirit in a uniquely radical way. Only he was thus made God's beloved Son, only with him did the Spirit "remain," only to him was the Spirit given "without measure" (cf. Jn 3:34 and n. 24 above). Above all, only he was given the Spirit in such a way that he could impart it to others. What is the basis in the NT of this power possessed by Jesus? To say with Matthew and John that he has been given the fulness of divine authority (Mt 28:18; Jn 3:35), which therefore includes authority to send the Spirit, is to answer the question correctly at a certain level, but the NT actually permits us to answer it at a deeper level. Among human beings, only Jesus has the authority to send the Spirit, because only he has appropriated it initially and made it more Cf. Dunn, Jesus and the Spirit 318-26, 350-57. and more completely his own through his life and his death. Only he can appropriate it, for only he has received the Spirit in a totally radical way, which is constitutive of his being. We too "receive" the Holy Spirit as "Spirit of sonship" (Rom 8:15), but in a nonradical way, for our sonship and daughterhood is only by "adoption" (Gal 4:5). While this is enough to enable us to live and act in the Spirit, it is not enough to empower us to make it our own. And it is because the Spirit has become his that he has the right to send Him (It) to others. The Father can bestow Him in the first place because He is the Father's Spirit, and it is because He has in turn become Jesus' Spirit that he too can send Him. This is the place for us to take up again our investigation of Jn 19:30, to try to resolve the question whether it has, in addition to the basic meaning already discovered, the higher meaning in which Jesus hands over the Spirit to his mother and the beloved disciple as representatives of the Church thus brought into being.
The English theologian
Barnabas Lindars rejects this interpretation on the ground that, if there is an indirect object of the verb paredöken (handed over), it must be God, not Jesus' mother and the beloved disciple. 35 However, there is no reason why God cannot be the indirect object in the basic meaning, and Jesus' mother and the beloved disciple the indirect object in the higher meaning. But we need some further indication in the text to validate the latter meaning as intended by the evangelist, and indeed such an indication is present. It is found in w. 34-35, where the evangelist tells of the issue of blood and water from Jesus' side and then goes on to lay such extraordinary store by this event: "He who saw it has borne witness-his testimony is true, and he knows that he tells the truththat you also may believe." Obviously it is not just a physiological event to which such significance is attached, but rather its spiritual import. I conclude our reflection on this text by pointing out that in its higher meaning the Spirit is conferred by Jesus as his own. The text, determined by its basic meaning rather than its higher one, says "the" Spirit, and not "his" Spirit, but in both meanings the implication is that the Spirit is his to hand over. In its higher meaning, therefore, this text supports the more general conclusion of Dunn, that as conferred by Jesus the Holy Spirit is his own and hence is the vehicle of his unique personality.
And what this is is clear enough in the

It is interesting, and somewhat ironic, to observe that because of its descending methodology the Johannine theology, to which in part we owe the knowledge that Jesus makes the Spirit his own, does not have the capacity to explain how this is done. Only the Synoptic theology, with its insight that the Holy Spirit is the founding principle of his divine
Sonship, has this capacity. But in the NT its development is not carried through to the point where this is achieved. This tends to show that the theology of John, as also of Paul, of the appropriation of the Spirit by Jesus stems from the experience of their respective communities, and so rests on an experiential rather than an intellectual base.
We are now in a position to draw the conclusion that as conferred by Jesus the Holy Spirit is Jesus' gift of himself to those who believe in him. It remains now to relate this statement to the idea of the Holy Spirit as love, and I do this with the aid of Peter Carnley's recent book on the resurrection. 38 Carnley's argument is elaborated in three steps, which I now present in summary form.
First, the giving of oneself to others is love, and because each person is unique in his or her particularity, each person's love is also unique. Jesus was remembered in the earliest Christian communities by the very distinctive and personal love he showed for others, and to express this the unusual word agape, as distinct from eros and philia, was chosen by Greek-speaking Christians. In the NT, therefore, agape does not have a generalized meaning; it means rather "the particularity of Jesus' love" for other people. Carnley's position as here outlined produces an explanation for the fact that, while the NT does not simply call the Holy Spirit love, in at least two texts it connects the Spirit with love. Such a connection presupposes a background, but it is a background that is not explicit in the NT; it has to be made explicit by some such reasoning as Carnley has provided. The two texts, both Pauline, are Rom 5:5, in which we are told that "God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit which has been given to us," and Gal 5:22, which significantly mentions love first in its list of the nine qualities that comprise the fruit of the Spirit. It is no problem that in the first instance it is God's love that is referred to, and in the second our own, for love begets love, as I shall have occasion to point out again soon.
In to be identified as Christ's love of God, which is evoked from him as the central member of that people, the stone which "has become the head of the corner" (1 Pet 2:7), and "the head of the body, the Church" (Col 1:18). The reason why this link is missing in the NT has already been explained, but the fact that it is missing in no way lessens its importance. Where theology used to be satisfied with seeing Christ simply as the channel of God's blessings to others, it now insists on seeing him first as the principal recipient of these blessings, and only as such their channel for others. Not only does this add an important new dimension to theology by taking the humanity of Christ more seriously, but it considerably enhances our appreciation of the blessings in question. Two examples must suffice. The first is revelation. Christ is now seen as the recipient of divine revelation before he is seen as its medium for others.
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And the second is grace. In my own work in this field Christ has to be understood as the recipient of God's grace before he can rightly be understood as its mediator. 44 The same is true in regard to God's love. We can only properly understand Jesus as the medium of God's love for us when we understand him first as its principal and active (therefore reciprocating) recipient. And, most importantly, it is only by laying hold of the missing link of Christ's love of God that we gain access to the mutual-love theory in its scriptural foundation. We know already that the radical bestowal of the Holy Spirit is the cause of the total human reality of Jesus, which is the same as his divine Sonship. We know also that this Sonship, under the continued inspiration of the Holy Spirit, comes to expression in his love of the Father in the course of his life and climactically at his death. In death he gives himself finally and definitively to the Father in loving submission to His will in the power of the Holy Spirit. Turning now to Jesus' sending of the Spirit on the Church, we know that the Spirit which he so sends he has appropriated and stamped with his own personality and love. This appropriation took place initially at his conception and gained momentum throughout his life, becoming complete at his death. But it must have happened within the bounds of his relationship with the Father, not primarily within those of his relationships with others. The Spirit was given to him in the first place as God's Spirit; it set up a relationship, a bond, with God, which was realized in the course of his life and especially in his death, though naturally this realization took place in the course of his dealings with others. Ordinary Christians, to whom the Spirit is also given, also relate to God in the power of the Spirit, and in death give themselves to Him in the Spirit, but though they "receive" and "possess" 46 Cf. John Honner, "Unity-in-Difference: Karl Rahner and Niels Bohr," TS 46 (1985) 480-506. 47 Cf. Rahner, "Reflections" 234.
the Spirit, they can never appropriate it, as Jesus does. His appropriation of the Spirit means that for him it becomes a principle of action, as it is with the Father Himself. Indeed, Jesus' appropriation of the Spirit is a pointer, as strong as any in the NT, to his divinity. The difference in the case of Jesus is that he relates to the Father in the Spirit received originally from the Father but made his own. And if the Spirit is also the vehicle of God's love, as the NT reveals it to be, then we must conclude that the Spirit is more than just the bond of love between the Father and Jesus His Son, as it is with us: it is their mutual love. When we say that Jesus sends the Spirit as his own upon the Church, we are expressing the fact that in the Spirit he gives himself to the Church. This is precisely what he does vis-à-vis God in the course of his life and on the cross: in the Spirit he gives himself to the Father. Each of these actions is love. As Carnley writes, "Loving ... is not just one of a number of attributes a person may be said to possess; a person's loving is the person himself or herself, going out and giving him or herself to another." 48 But the radical character of Jesus' self-giving to the Father is only evident in his appropriation of the Spirit, which is revealed in his sending of the Spirit as his own upon the Church. True, the ground of his appropriation of the Spirit is revealed already in the Synoptic theology of the radical nature of the bestowal of the Spirit on him at his conception, but the fact of this appropriation is only revealed in his own sending of the Spirit. This provides for us the hindsight with which we can appreciate the ground as it exists in Matthew and Luke. It is at this point that we are helped by grasping the "unity-in-difference" of love of God and love of neighbor. The character of Jesus' loving self-giving to the Church illumines that of his self-giving to God, and so enables us to understand that the way in which he gives himself to the Father in death is that he there definitively returns the Spirit as his own to the Father in love. Further, the idea of Jesus returning the Spirit to the Father only becomes meaningful when it is seen as Jesus' total seZ/-giving to Him. Hence the Spirit is not only the Father's love for Jesus, but is revealed, admittedly in a way that needs to be clarified, as also Jesus' love for the Father. Thus the Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and Jesus His Son. And thus we apprehend the mutual-love theory in its scriptural foundation. The theory can be discussed or applied at any of these levels. But from the viewpoint of discussion, particularly ecumenical discussion, its chief importance is verified at the level of the immanent Trinity. The point at issue will always be the validity of inferences from the biblical to the immanent Trinity; what is said subsequently at the level of the economic Trinity will follow automatically from what is firmly acquired at the level of the immanent Trinity.
THE MUTUAL-LOVE THEORY AND ITS PLACE IN THEOLOGY
The Acquisition of the Theory
Features of the Theory
The main feature of the theory is that in its formulation at the level of the immanent Trinity it provides the appropriate trinitarian context for the data of ascending Christology and indeed all ascending theology. The reason for this should be obvious from what has already been said: the mutual-love theory is the theology of the Trinity that is extrapolated from ascending data. Therefore such data will harmonize with it and it alone. Forcing such data into accommodation with either the filioque, the per filium, or monopatrism is a methodological error and leads to errors of content.
I mentioned earlier that, despite the fact that Augustine considered them together, the mutual-love theory is very different from the filioque. The reason is that the filioque is an outward-moving model of the Trinity, in that it has to do with the procession of the Son out of the Father, and then with that of the Holy Spirit as a continuation of this movement as He proceeds out of the Son as well as the Father; and the mutual-love theory is an inward-moving model, in that the Son, having moved out of the Father, is reclaimed by the Father's love and returns to Him in that love which he has now made his own. This being said, it should be mentioned that the mutual-love theory affirms the filioque, as it were in passing. The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son inasmuch as the Son makes Him his own and returns Him to the Father as his own. The Father and the Son are therefore coprinciples of the Holy Spirit, and since the Spirit is one, they must constitute a single principle. I share Dalmais's hope that the mutual-love theory will play an important part in reconciling East and West on the doctrine of the Trinity, but the fact must be faced that it presupposes the filioque. Perhaps it does so in a way that will prove acceptable to the East, for in it we clearly see that the Spirit issues ultimately from the Father alone, in that the In these conceptions of the Trinity there is nothing anomalous in the Gift's having more than one giver (though properly speaking it is the gift of the one from whom it comes ultimately). In the immanent Trinity, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit is not given, because He is not bestowed gratuitously. 51 He is, however, bestowed, but bestowed by the Father and the Son on each other. This is something that we know not from the filioque but from the mutual-love theory. Indeed, this is one respect in which the two theologies stand in sharp distinction to each other. Nor do the Father and the Son here constitute a single "bestower," for the simple reason that they bestow the Spirit on each other, and therefore in this respect stand in opposition to each other. They are therefore the "bestowers" of the Holy Spirit. The opening to the outside, to us, comes through the "unity-in-difference" of Jesus' love of God and love of neighbor, but for this to be understood systematically it is necessary to invoke Rahner's transcendental theology of the divinity of Christ, whereby "the incarnation of God is the unique and highest instance of the actualization o* the essence of human reality, which consists in this: that man is insofar as he abandons himself to the absolute mystery whom we call God." 52 This matter I have explained in detail elsewhere. 63 Finally, the theory enables us to reconcile the competing claims of ascending and descending Christology in a balanced way, and to appreciate the contribution of ascending Christology, which only now is beginning to assert itself, especially in Catholic theology. It is true that the descending Christology of the Fourth Gospel, and especially its prologue, determined much (though not all) of the Christological and trinitarian thought of the Church Fathers and the whole development of official teaching on these subjects in the early centuries of Christianity; and it is also true, even obvious, that all this deserves to be assessed positively. However, already in this essay we have seen that the descending method, if unchecked, simply obliterates the contribution of ascending Christology. It is indeed a blunt instrument. Our case in point is the Incarnation (the word itself belonging to the vocabulary of descending Christology). 54 Chalcedon was eventually to interpret the prologue of St. John's Gospel in the sense that the second person of the immanent Trinity assumed human nature in Jesus of Nazareth, and so formulated the faith for Christians of succeeding ages, a faith that has stayed in place despite the ravages of several major schisms. But this theology and doctrine overlook completely the role of the Holy Spirit in the Incarnation, and even when later it attempted to discover that role, as in the theology of Thomas Aquinas, it fell far short of the reality that is revealed by ascending Christology. 55 The . This is Bonaventure's answer, 59 and it seems to me to be correct. But the question of the singularity of mutual love at the human level is not irrelevant. In the Trinity we do not expect to find a contradiction of human spiritual experience but rather its purification and perfection. In the biblical and the economic Trinity the mutual love of the Father and Christ is a differentiated reality, but even so a single reality, the Holy Spirit. The differentiation arises from the disproportion which exists between divinity (as in the Father) and humanity (as in Christ) 63 As the mutual love of Father and Son, the Holy Spirit is, in the words of Thomas (before he adopted the questionable opinion that love has an immanent term), a "subsistent operation" (operatio subsistens).
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Since the mutual love subsists as a person, it is here objectivized. 60 65 This seems an acceptable refinement, as it expresses the personification of the Holy Spirit without buying into the question of whether love, by analogy with knowledge, has an immanent term. And it enables us to see more clearly that the mutual love is the proximate ground, and the essential love the ultimate ground, of the procession of the Holy Spirit.
A second objection to the theory is that it is too anthropomorphic. This, in fact, is a more general form of the objection just dealt with. However, other instances are brought forward also. An important one is the use of the term "relationship" in the theory. Congar expresses this objection in the following way: "The word 'relationship' is used in the sense in which it occurs in human psychology, whereas, in the doctrine of the Trinity, it has a technical and metaphysical meaning."
66 Provided the two senses of the word are not confused, I do not see that this objection has any weight. Underlying Congar's statement there seems to be the idea that a technical and metaphysical meaning has some advantage over a psychological meaning. If so, it is a gratuitous assumption. That in the mutual-love theory relationships of a "psychological" kind are held to exist among the persons of the Trinity and are made the subject matter of theology does not immediately permit the theory to be branded as anthropomorphic, although of course the danger of anthropomorphism is present, as it is in any human speculation about the Trinity, especially where analogy is at work. Nor would I aver that this danger has never been succumbed to. The recognition of the existence of psychological relations among the persons of the Trinity means simply that we are dealing with spiritual and personal realities.
In this connection it is worth noting that the entire Christian religion rests on a psychological fact, i.e. Jesus' awareness of his unique relationship with God. Out of this comes his sense of God's loving initiative in his regard, his election, to which he sees his whole life simply as a response. From this flows his sense of the kingdom and the Fatherhood of God and so his entire gospel message, all of which is validated by God in raising him from the dead. When theology subsequently reflects on these basic data and eventually arrives at a doctrine of the immanent Trinity with its metaphysical relations, it should not forget that the whole edifice depends on one simple psychological relation. And the theological project is much weakened if psychological relations are not allowed to play their part, which is not just in prayer and poetry, as Congar would allow. They imply metaphysical relations and complement their contribution.
I pass on to two final objections, which I raise myself. The first is: How can a subsistent operation be a person? Or, put differently, how can an operation be subsistent? The difficulty arises at the level of imagination rather than conceptuality. Process theology would have its own way of viewing this, but in traditional thought in any being other than God an operation would be an accident. In God, however, there can be no accidents. Therefore, whatever exists in God subsists, either absolutely in the divine nature or relatively as one of the persons. Though there is such a thing as the divine love, identical with the divine nature, the mutual love of the Father and the Son is not simply to be identified with it; rather, it constitutes the third person of the Trinity, the Holy Spirit. This means that it is a distinct spiritual hypostasis, center of spiritual activity, which in the unity of the divine nature it has in common with the other two persons, unique only in its origin, the manner of its procession, and its property of being the mutual love of the other two. The latter characteristic makes it a hypostasis in an utterly different way from the others. But this should not cause surprise. The words of Rahner should be heeded here:
Every doctrine of the Trinity must emphasize that the "hypostasis" is precisely that in God through which Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct from one another; that, wherever there exists between the three of them a real, univocal correspondence, there is absolute numerical identity. Hence the concept of hypostasis, applied to God, cannot be a universal univocal concept, applying to each of the three persons in the same way. 67 The last objection is: How can Jesus' human love of God be the Holy Spirit? 68 To understand my answer, it is necessary to understand the transcendental Christology of Rahner, which in turn is to be seen in the light of the enhypostasia tradition which began with Leontius of Byzantium. 69 The hope to have shown that in Western thought it should be seen as the necessary complement of the filioque, providing a way of organizing and expressing the data of ascending theology in the context of the economic Trinity, as the filioque does for the data of descending theology. True, there is one respect in which it must be regarded as secondary: it has to do with understanding the Holy Spirit after (in order, not in time) His procession and its unique character are first established. In the espistemological order, the order of experience and discovery, the mutual-love theory has priority over the filioque, in the sense that the Christian religion arises out of Jesus' unique awareness of union with God; but in the ontological order, the order of givenness, the filioque comes first, because distinction of persons logically precedes their union, and their procession must precede their return. But in this same order, from another point of view, the mutual-love theory takes the priority, because it presupposes and completes the filioque. In the light of these remarks it will be clear that the organization of an adequate treatise on the Trinity must encompass distinction and union, procession and return, the filioque and the mutual-love theory. Therefore it will be the NT's fundamental and comprehensive doctrine of salvation, rather than some derived and particular doctrine such as the filioque, that will ultimately dictate the scope of the doctrine of the immanent Trinity and indicate and moderate its contents, i.e. provide the basis for its organization.
The mutual-love theory gives us important information about the Trinity that we would not otherwise have. In particular, it tells us that the Son as it were faces the Father, as well as facing away from Him. As he faces away from the Father he proceeds from the Father, is sent into the world, and also constitutes with the Father the coprinciple of the procession of the Holy Spirit and cosender of the Holy Spirit upon the Church. But as he faces the Father he is joined to Him in a mutual love which is identical with the Holy Spirit. The return to God, of Jesus and ourselves with him, is explained in the light of this theology as we in our spiritual journey are caught up in this same relationship of Sonship. I remarked above that descending theology should not be allowed to obliterate the contribution of ascending theology. Therefore what the mutual-love theory can tell us about the Trinity, particularly at the economic level, should be carefully heeded, and not allowed to be blasted out of existence by the workings-out of the filioque. Now a word about terminology. In my early publications on this theme I called the mutual-love theory the bestowal model of the Trinity. The word "model" is apt because this theology of the Trinity, like the filioque and all other trinitarian theologies, is extrapolated from just one set of data and fulfils just one methodological function. In other words, the word "model" relativizes the tendency to set up one theology as absolute, as "the" correct way of understanding the Trinity. I called it the "bestowal" model because it, and only it, has to do with the bestowal of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son on each other. But the disadvantage of this word is that it fails to bring out the contrast which exists with the filioque. I had called the latter and the other trinitarian theologies, i.e. the per filium and monopatrism, examples of the "procession" model, and I still regard this term as apt because these theologies have to do with the outward movement, the "procession," of the Son and the Holy Spirit from the Father. By way of contrast, I have come eventually to call the mutual-love theory "the model of return." This is because it has to do essentially with the return of the Son to the Father in love, their mutual love which is the Holy Spirit. This term serves better to bring out the deepest essence of the model and also its contrast with the procession model. Until a more suitable term is suggested, I shall continue to prefer it to my earlier choice.
Finally, the mutual-love theory may be destined to play a part in East-West relations, but this can only be as it is approached through the filioque, which remains a major ecumenical problem. Offsetting this, though, to some extent is the clear perception that the Spirit issues ultimately from the Father alone. I conclude with the first and fourth verses of a beautiful hymn translated from the Latin "Amor Patris et Filii,* unfortunatley little known (at least in Australia), numbered 438 in The English Hymnal, and set to a noble melody by Orlando Gibbons:
Love of the Father, love of God the Son, From whom all came, in whom was all begun; Who formest heavenly beauty out of strife, Creation's whole desire and breath of life. Purest and highest, wisest and most just, There is no truth save only in thy trust; Thou dost the mind from earthly dreams recall, And bring through Christ to Him for whom are all.
